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CUSTODY RELOCATION: MORE QUESTIONS
THAN ANSWERS RESULT FROM HIGH COURT
OPINIONS IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK
A couple have been married for eight years and have three
young children. They decide to divorce. How can each parent
ensure his or her involvement in the children's upbringing
should the other parent decide to move to a different geo-
graphic location?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, thirty percent of children under eighteen lived
with only one parent-more than double the number of chil-
dren who lived with a single parent in 1970.1 Single parent
households, coupled with an increasingly mobile society,2
have presented a relatively new question for the judicial sys-
tem: should one parent be permitted to relocate with a child'
away from the other parent?"
The issue of whether a parent has a right to relocate
with a child was addressed by California and New York's
highest courts in early 1996.' Within less than twenty-one
days of each other,6 the New York Court of Appeals in Tropea
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARCH ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT POPULATION SURvEY, BRIEF CB94-116 (Aug. 10, 1994). The
number of family groups maintained by single parents in 1970 was 13%. Id. In
1988, 24% of children were living with a single parent, with mothers accounting
for about 87% of all single parents. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 162, STUDIES IN MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY, BRIEF SB-3-89 (Mar. 1988). One parent situations are usually the re-
sult of divorce, separation, out-of-wedlock births, or widowhood. Id.
2. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1996). Twenty per-
cent of Americans change their residences each year. Id.
3. The term "child" in this comment refers to the singular and plural as
well as the feminine and masculine.
4. Although there is no explicit provision in the United States Constitu-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has inferred that citizens have a "right
to travel" from various constitutional provisions. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). This right, however, has not been interpreted to extend to the
right to relocate with a child. In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182,
187 (Ct. App. 1992).
5. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996); In re Marriage of Bur-
gess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
6. Tropea was decided on March 26, 1996. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 145.
Burgess was decided on April 15, 1996. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d at
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v. Tropea7 and the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Burgess8 held that the custodial parent was permit-
ted to move with the child against the wishes of the noncus-
todial parent.9
The reaction to these decisions ° indicates a growing po-
larization between two conflicting views of how a child should
be raised." One view is that a child will benefit most from
frequent and continuing contact of both parents. This view
requires each parent to sacrifice his or her own interests to
ensure continuing contact with the child by the other par-
ent. 2 The other view is that the child's well being depends
most directly on the care provided by the custodial parent, so
that the well-being of the custodial parent should be of pri-
mary concern." Conflicts that arise from a custodial parent's
decision to relocate, in circumstances in which the move will
restrict the other parent's access to the child, are so conten-
tious because resolving them requires choosing between these
polarized views."' The Burgess and Tropea decisions are ul-
timately unsatisfying because they attempt to resolve the is-
sue without acknowledging the conflict." As a result, they
ensure continuing controversy by failing to provide adequate
guidance to the lower courts. 6
The background section of this comment will examine
the origins of the legal conflict. 7 First, this section will es-
tablish the legal framework and terminology structuring the
courts' approach to relocation cases. 8 Second, this section
will explore the substantive basis for the conflicting views,
examining the role of gender and changing family roles in the
473.
7. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
8. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
9. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 153; Burgess, 913 P.2d at 476.
10. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of
Children and Custodial Parents: Public Policy Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q.
245 (1996); Leslie Ellen Shear, Life Stories, Doctrines, and Decision Making
Three High Courts Confront the Move-Away Dilemma, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 439 (1996).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.2-3.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
14. See discussion infra Part II.D.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
16. See discussion infra Part I.D.
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
1. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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dispute. 9 Third, the section will discuss the cases leading up
to Burgess"° and Tropea2' and explain why these decisions
compelled a reexamination of the issues."
The analysis section will then explore why Burgess and
Tropea have not fully resolved the relocation issue and the
unpredictability that remains at the trial court level.23 This
comment then proposes new legislation that incorporates the
best aspects of both the Burgess and Tropea decisions to re-
solve this dispute. 24 The proposal identifies areas of consen-
sus, where it is possible to bridge the otherwise polarized
conflict, and suggests an alternative to current laws that will
ensure both flexibility and uniformity in relocation cases."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Custody, Relocation, and the "Best Interests of a Child"
Test
Divorcing parents typically live in the same location, and
the overwhelming majority resolve the custody issues associ-
ated with their divorce without resorting to litigation.6 Sev-
enty-five percent of custodial mothers will move, however,
within four years of divorce.27 If the move is sufficiently far,
the existing custody arrangement may be disrupted.28  Re-
solving custody issues associated with parental moves-
whether they be triggered by a job promotion, change of em-
ployment, remarriage,2 9 or some other factor-involves issues
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
21. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
22. See discussion infra Part II.C.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 271-72 (1992).
27. Maura Dolan, Justices Ease Relocation of Children in Divorce Cases;
Families: State High Court Gives Wider Freedom to Parent with Primary Cus-
tody. More Legal Battles Are Predicted., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at Al. For
example, according to experts, three of four custodial mothers move at least
once within four years of separation or divorce, with 11.5 million minor children
relocating each year. Id.
28. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
29. The Burgess court pointed out that approximately one out of five Ameri-
cans change residences each year and "economic necessity and remarriage ac-
count for the bulk of relocations." In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480
5231998]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
as complex as the original custody determination itself with
considerably less judicial guidance."° Judicial review of a
move begins with a clear understanding of the pre-move cus-
tody arrangement.3'
1. Definining "Custody" in California and New York
a. California
Part of the confusion surrounding child custody stems
from the numerous definitions of the word "custody."32 For
example, California recognizes joint custody,3 joint legal cus-
tody,34 joint physical custody," sole legal custody, 6 and sole
physical custody.37
"Joint custody" is defined as both joint physical custody
and joint legal custody.38 "Joint legal custody" is defined as
the right and responsibility of both parents "to make the de-
cisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a
child,"39 such as choosing a medical doctor or selecting a
school for a child. When parents have "joint physical cus-
tody" each parent has "significant periods of physical cus-
tody ... in such a way as to assure a child of frequent and
continuing contact with both parents."40 "Sole legal custody"
grants one parent the right and responsibility to make the
health, education, and welfare decisions of a child.41 Finally,
"sole physical custody" means that a child resides with one
parent, subject to visitation by the noncustodial parent. 2
At the time of an initial custody determination, Califor-
nia law does not recognize a custody preference. 3 Instead, it
employs the "best interests of the child" standard applied on
(Cal. 1996).
30. See discussion infra Part IV.
31. See discussion infra Part II.A.1-2.
32. See infra notes 38-42, 52-55 and accompanying text.
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3002 (West 1994).
34. Id. § 3003.
35. Id. § 3004.
36. Id. § 3006.
37. Id. § 3007.
38. Id. § 3002.
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3003 (West 1994).
40. Id. § 3004.
41. Id. § 3006.
42. Id. § 3007.
43. "The order of preference begins with the 'best interests of the child'
standard as provided in Section 3011." Id. § 3040.
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a case-by-case basis." California law, however, carries a pre-
sumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a
child,45 suggesting that custody be granted to the parent most
likely to encourage the child's continuing contact with both
parents even though joint custody in itself is not to be pre-
sumed."
In practice, joint legal custody is awarded in nearly
eighty percent of California divorces.47 Joint physical cus-
tody, however, is less common, occurring in fewer than half of
divorce cases.48 Irrespective of whether joint custody or sole
custody (or a permutation thereof) is determined either at the
time of a marital dissolution or a custody proceeding, the
court retains power to modify custody arrangements 9 for the
duration of a child's minority.0 Furthermore, California has
a long established rule permitting the parent who has cus-
tody to move unless it would be to the detriment of the
child.5
b. New York
In contrast to California law, New York law has rela-
tively few terms to define custody arrangements.52  A
"custody determination"53 made by the court establishes ei-
ther temporary or permanent custody of a child, including
44. Id. § 3011.
45. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994). The presumption favoring joint
custody is subject to section 3011 of the California Family Code, which outlines
the best interest of a child considerations. Id. § 3011.
46. Section 3040 of the California Family Code establishes an order of pref-
erence when granting custody. Id. § 3040. Section 3040(1) states in part:
To both parents jointly pursuant to Chapter 4 (commencing with Sec-
tion 3080) or to either parent. In making an order granting custody to
either parent, the court shall consider, among other factors, which par-
ent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact
with the noncustodial parent, subject to Section 3011 ....
Id. § 3040(1) (emphasis added).
47. MACCOBY & MNOOKiN, supra note 26, at 288.
48. See id. at 104.
49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3402(g) (West 1994).
50. Section 7002 of the California Family Code provides that "a minor is
under the age of 18 years old unless in a valid marriage, on active duty with the
armed forces of the United States, or has received a declaration of emancipa-
tion pursuant to §7122." Id. § 7002.
51. Id. § 7501.
52. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1988).
53. Id. § 75-c.2.
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visitation rights by the noncustodial parent."' "Physical cus-
tody" is defined as "actual possession and control of a child."5
Under New York law, the custodial parent is the parent who
cares for the child on a day-to-day basis.56 The noncustodial
parent is granted visitation rights if it is in the best interests
of the child.57 However, the New York law does not specifi-
cally define "custodial" or "noncustodial" parent." Addition-
ally, as in California, a custody decree may be modified, re-
placing any prior decree.59
2. Relocation and the "Best Interests of the Child"
In situations where the noncustodial parent seeks to
change custody in response to the custodial parent's request
to relocate with the child,6 ° courts apply the "best interests of
the child"6 ' analysis to decide whether a custodial parent will
be permitted to move.62 Neither California nor New York has
a statute that expressly addresses the problem of move away
cases." In California, the courts have invoked two statutes64
in support of their decisions: the best interests of the child
standard, codified in section 3011 of the California Family
Code,65 and section 7501 of the Family Code which the Cali-
54. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1996).
55. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-c.8 (McKinney 1996). Parents of a child in
New York are required to support the child until the age of twenty-one years.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(b) (McKinney 1996).
56. Id. § 240.
57. Id.
58. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-c (defining terms in Article 5-A-Uniform
Custody Jurisdiction Act).
59. Id. § 75-c.7.
60. See discussion infra Parts II.C-D.
61. Neither California nor New York have a clear definition of what is con-
sidered to be the "best interests of a child" codified in their statutes. See CAL.
FAM CODE § 3011 (West 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1) (McKinney 1996).
The New York statute merely states the phrase "best interests of the child"
without further clarification. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney
1996). The California statute gives some examples of what constitutes the "best
interests of the child," but allows the court to consider any factor it deems rele-
vant. See CAL. FAM CODE § 3011 (West 1994).
62. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
63. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
64. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3011, 7501.
65. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Battenburg, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871 (Ct. App.
1994). In fact, the Battenburg court went so far as to pronounce section 3040 of
the California Family Code as the determinative test when it stated "[tihe test
has always been and continues to be the 'child's best interests.'" Id. at 872; see
also In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Mar-
526 [Vol. 38
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fornia Supreme Court in Burgess66 interpreted as giving a
custodial parent the presumptive right to change the resi-
dence of a child absent a determination that the move would
adversely impact the child." New York does not address re-
location directly through legislation, but the courts have used
the general language of section 240 of New York Domestic
Relations Law to make decisions that are "in the court's dis-
cretion... [in light of] the best interests of the child."8
Although these "best interests" statutes may technically
govern relocation decisions, commentators observe that "a
'best-interest-of-the-child' standard without more is so amor-
phous as to be unhelpful."69 In move away cases, even more
than in initial custody decisions, the "best interests" standard
obscures rather than illuminates judicial decision making.7
B. Custody, Relocation, and the Issue of Gender
The best interests of the child standard has been con-
tinuously used as a custody standard, covering dramatic
shifts in custody decision making.7 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the paternal presumption gave way to a
maternal one for a child of "tender years."72 By the 1970s, di-
vorcing couples increasingly assumed "joint custody" as an
expression of an egalitarian commitment that both parents
should be involved in childrearing.73 All of these custody
preferences have been administered under the rubric of a
riage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986). Section 3011(a) of the Cali-
fornia Family Code was formerly section 4600(b) of the California Civil Code.
In re Marriage of Battenburg, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871 (Ct. App. 1994).
66. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
67. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994) ("A parent entitled to the custody of
a child has the right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of
the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the
child.").
68. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney 1996).
69. Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 10, at 298. Other critics of the best
interests test have suggested that the term be expanded to encompass the best
interests of the family. Shear, supra note 10, at 457.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.
71. See Richard A. Warshak, Gender Bias in Child Custody Decisions, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 396, 397-98 (July 1996). While the use of the
term "best interests of the child" is relatively new, the focus has always been on
the protection, support, and care for a child. Id.
72. Id. at 396-97.
73. See generally Katharine Bartlett & Carol Stack, Joint Custody, Femi-
nism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 12 (1986)
(discussing women's dependency as caregivers).
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best interests rationale, and different judges in different ju-
risdictions continue to make decisions that vary markedly in
their interpretation of that standard."4
Both mothers' and fathers' groups have criticized judicial
determinations for bias based on the gender of the parent.75
While modern courts have embraced gender neutral custody
presumptions,"6 they have not-and cannot--escape the per-
ception that gender is a factor in determining issues such as
the weight to be given to the caretaking role, the relative im-
portance of continued contact with both parents, and a vari-
ety of other custody factors.77
1. Gender and Child Custody-The Courts' View
Laws in California and New York make it clear that the
fitness of a parent for childrearing is not to be determined by
a parent's sex.78 California uses the "best interests" test to
determine which parent receives primary custody and does
not create a preference for one type of custody arrangement
over another.79 Under section 3040 of the California Family
Code, custody of a child may be granted to either the father
or mother." According to section 3040, the court "shall not
prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex."81
Neither parent is entitled to custody as a matter of right."
Thus, each parent is equally entitled to custody, depending
on the court's determination of the child's best interests.3
New York's provision for gender neutrality is more force-
74. See discussion supra Part 1.C.
75. See Warshak, supra note 71, at 397. Working mothers argue that they
are being held to a higher standard than working fathers, while fathers argue
that historical preferences towards mothers continue to influence judges in cus-
tody decisions. Id. at 396.
76. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
77. See discussion infra Part IV.
78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 1994); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240(1)(McKinney 1996). California and New York statutes have also made it very
clear that each parent has a duty to support his or her child financially. CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3900 (West 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §33 (4) (McKinney 1988).
79. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994). ("This section establishes nei-
ther a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint
physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest
discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.").






ful than California's. Under section 240(1) of New York Do-
mestic Relations Law, "[i]n all cases there shall be no prima
facie right to the custody of the child in either parent."84
Child custody determinations in New York are made "in the
court's discretion... having regard to the circumstances of
the case and of the respective parties and to the best inter-
ests of the child."85
2. Gender and Child Custody-A Mother's View
Mothers overwhelmingly receive custody at divorce, usu-
ally provide the majority of child care (even in situations
where joint custody is awarded), and often have the strongest
emotional and psychological ties with the child.86 In all four-
teen relocation cases to reach the appellate level in California
and New York since 1992, a mother attempted to relocate
with the child against the father's wishes." Of those cases,
only the Messler case in New York involved a move by a
mother who was not a custodial parent." Not surprisingly,
the Burgess attorney rejoiced that "[t]he legal chain that held
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney 1996) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. See generally, Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child
Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992) (advocating a maternal
deference standard).
87. California cases include: In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1996) (mother permitted to move with child); In re Marriage of Battenburg, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 871 (Ct. App. 1994) (mother permitted to move with child); In re
Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Ct. App. 1994) (mother permitted to
move with child); In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993)
(mother permitted to move with child); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr.
2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992) (relocation request of mother and child granted at the
trial level, reversed and remanded on appeal). New York cases include: Tropea
v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996) (mother and child in both cases in deci-
sion were permitted to move); Matter of Daniels, 637 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div.
1996) (mother's request to move with child remanded); In the Matter of
Messler, 638 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1996) (noncustodial mother's petition to
move with child away from the custodial father denied); Carroll v. Carroll, 628
N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div. 1995) (mother permitted to move with child); In the
Matter of Wilson, 629 N.Y.S.2d 326, (App. Div. 1995) (mother prohibited from
moving with child); Bleck v. Brown, 629 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div. 1995) (mother
prohibited from moving with child); Leslie v. Leslie, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App.
Div. 1992) (mother prohibited from moving with child); Lavelle v. Freeman 581
N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1992) (mother prohibited from moving with child);
Elkus v. Elkus, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (App. Div. 1992) (mother prohibited from
moving with child).
88. 638 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1996). The noncustodial mother was seek-
ing to modify custody, but since she would be moving out of state, the court's
decision also considered her relocation plans. Id. at 244.
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[mothers] hostage to their ex-spouse's desires or whims has
now been forever severed"89 when his client was permitted to
move with her children.
Regarding the general issue of custody, feminists have
argued that the courts should tie custody rights to the as-
sumption of responsibility for the child.9" In the Burgess case,
a commentator has argued that the California Supreme
Court relied heavily on an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf
of Dr. Judith Wallerstein.9 The Wallerstein brief argued
that the stability of a child's primary caregiver is a major fac-
tor in a child's well-being after divorce, and that the ability to
move often contributes further to stability." To the extent
that mothers are the most likely to be the primary caretak-
ers, Dr. Wallerstein's position supports their right to move.9"
3. Gender and Child Custody-A Father's View
In 1995, there were approximately 280 fathers' rights
groups in the United States.94 Members of these groups as-
sert that "mothers aren't enough, children need both par-
ents."8 Men often perceive divorce proceedings, particularly
custody arrangements, as unfair to fathers" and as being
89. Dolan, supra note 27, at Al.
90. See generally, Karen Czapansky, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991) (arguing that mothers as-
sume disproportionate responsibility for children that is not legally recognized).
91. Shear, supra note 10, at 451. Even though commentators believe that
Dr. Wallerstein's brief was influential to the holding in Burgess, it is important
to note that the decision only referenced Dr. Wallerstein's brief in a footnote
that emphasized respecting the opinions of "reasonably mature" adolescents
when making custody decisions. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483.
Dr. Wallerstein's brief was adapted into an article. See Judith S. Wallerstein &
Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considera-
tions in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996).
92. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 91, at 307-15.
93. Id. The article adapted from Dr. Wallerstein's brief does not favor one
parent over another based upon gender; but, rather, the focus is on the role of
the parent in a child's life. Id. In response to the Burgess decision, Dr. Waller-
stein was quoted as saying, "nobody is saying that children should be taken
away ... [blut it is in the best interest of the children to maintain the stability
of the post-divorce family and not to go back to court whenever a parent wants
to move away." Dolan, supra note 27, at Al.
94. Thom Weidlich, Dads' Rights Advocates Come of Age, Once Just and
Angry Fringe, Now They Target Custody, Welfare and Child Support Laws,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at 20.
95. Id.
96. James R. Dudley, Noncustodial Fathers Speak About Their Parental
Role, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 3, 410, 418-19 (1996).
530 [Vol. 38
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"gender neutral in name only."97 Since only one in ten chil-
dren live with their fathers after divorce,98 fathers who wish
to take an active part in their child's upbringing perceive a
bias against them in custody proceedings."
In support of a father's continued involvement with his
child, it is argued that a father's role, however different from
a mother's role, is equally as meaningful and important in a
child's development. °° Research suggests that men are just
as competent as women in providing day-to-day care of chil-
dren, such as feeding, bathing, and nurturing.' Moreover,
there is a growing number of noncustodial fathers who, even
several years after a divorce, maintain weekly visits with
their child, disproving the contention that men want custody
simply to pay less support or to punish their ex-spouses.' °
Not surprisingly, the recent decisions in Burgess and Tropea
are seen as a defeat to men who actively participate in child
rearing.
10 3
C. Relocation Cases in California and New York Prior to
1996
Prior to the Burgess'°" and Tropea °5 decisions in early
1996, lower court decisions in California and New York had
been inconsistent. 6 Courts typically held either that a cus-
todial parent was presumed to have a right to move or be de-
nied relocation, asserting a general presumption that a move
constitutes a change in circumstances with the burden on the
moving party to prove that relocation would be in the "best
interests of the child."07
Since the "best interests of the child" standard is not
97. Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, in 4 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 210, 211 (Richard E. Behrman ed., 1994).
98. Warshak, supra note 71, at 398.
99. Id. at 398-99.
100. Thompson, supra note 97, at 217.
101. Id. at 219.
102. Id. at 223.
103. The attorney who represented Mr. Burgess, noting the loss a parent will
have when the other parent has moved a great distance, called it "tragic," and
said, "I am surprised they went to this extreme .... A child needs both parents
actively involved in his or her life to have a meaningful life." Dolan, supra note
27, at Al.
104. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
105. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
106. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1-2.
107. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1-2.
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clearly defined in a statute, a judge may take into account
many factors, exclude others, and give each factor a "weight"
as determined by that judge. 'o' Appellate courts have at-
tempted to provide guidance and uniformity to lower courts
by developing different "tests" to analyze custody disputes
and visitation arrangements. 9
1. How California Dealt with Relocation Cases Prior to
the Burgess Decision.
Prior to In re Marriage of Burgess,"' the best interests
test prevailed as the overriding consideration on appeal."'
The custodial parent had the burden to prove the relocation
was necessary."' Appellate courts honored trial court deci-
sions unless the court abused its discretion."' Deference was
given to the trial courts because "[a]ppellate courts cannot
micro-manage the custodial status of minor children who are
subject to the lower court's jurisdiction in move away
cases."
114
For example, in In re Marriage of Selzer"' a relocation
request was granted to a mother who had sole physical cus-
tody of a child. The purpose of her move was to secure a bet-
ter job in a nearby city."6 The father appealed, arguing that
the move interfered with visitation and would remove the
108. Section 240 of the New York Domestic Relations Law states that a
judge can enter an order for custody that is "in the court's discretion" and fur-
ther states that "justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the
case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1996). The New York statute does not define
what the best interests of the child actually means. Id. Similarly, in section
3011 of the California Family Code, the "best interests of the child" are dis-
cussed in general terms of health, safety, and welfare and "any other factors" a
court may find relevant. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994).
109. See discussion infra Parts II.D.1-2.
110. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
111. In re Marriage of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737, 738 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting In re Marriage of Carlson, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1330 (Ct. App. 1991)) ("The
precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial
court order advanced the best interests of the child.").
112. See In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re
Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of
Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986).
113. Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298.
114. In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 829 (Ct. App. 1994).




child from the community where she grew up."7 In reaching
its decision, the court of appeals reviewed five earlier cases
that addressed the issue of relocation"8 and concluded that
numerous factors may be considered by the trial court."9 Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, these factors must be ana-
lyzed so as to produce a result which ultimately satisfies the
best interests of the child2 ° so that the decision is likely to be
sustained on appeal. This approach was to be applied even
when courts employed "divergent approaches to a 'move
away' issue."' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, finding no abuse of discretion.'22
However, using divergent approaches to relocation cases
has created inconsistent and confusing outcomes.'23 In 1993,
for example, in In re Marriage of Roe,'24 the court of appeal
for the second district held that a mother who shared joint
custody with the child's father was permitted to move to an-
other state because her current husband could not find em-
ployment in California.'25 But in 1991, in In re Marriage of
117. Id. at 825.
118. In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993) (granting
custodial parent's request to move only after proving that the move would be in
the child's best interest); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct.
App. 1992) (reversing and remanding a trial court ruling granting the custodial
parent's move); In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr 840 (Ct. App. 1991)
(denying the custodial parent permission to move with the child because it
would impede continuing contact with both parents); In re Marriage of Fingert,
271 Cal. Rptr. 389 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the primary custodial parent
had a constitutional right to travel with a minor child); and In re Marriage of
Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the custodial parent's
desire to move was sufficient to revisit the existing custody arrangement as a
changed circumstance and put the burden on the moving parent to prove that it
was in the child's best interest).
119. In re Marriage of Selzer 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 829 (Ct. App. 1994). The
court cited examples of facts to be considered in move away cases, including "a
custodial child's age and preference, if expressed; an order granting the noncus-
todial parent expended custodial or visitation time... ; the moving party's mo-
tives; the necessity, if any, of continuity in custody; and effect on the economic




123. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
124. In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 301. The court in Roe acknowledged the provision in section
4600(a) of the Civil Code (now section 3040 of the California Family Code) that
assures minor children continuing contact with both parents, but the Roe court
also stressed a qualification made in subdivision (d) that expressly restricts a
court from presuming that one type of custody arrangement is preferred over
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Carlson,2 ' the fifth district California court of appeal held
that a mother who had sole physical custody of two minor
children was not permitted to leave California because it
would impede the father's exercise of visitation. 127 Even
though the mother desired to move back to be near her family
in the state in which she grew up and in which the parties
lived during part of the marriage, the father's right to visita-
tion prevailed.12 Carlson and Roe illustrate that the labels of
joint and sole custody codified by statute and used in court
opinions have not been determinative in relocation cases.'29
2. How New York Courts Dealt with Relocation Cases
Prior to the Tropea Decision.
Since 1992 and prior to Tropea v. Tropea,3 ° eight reloca-
tion cases reached the New York Appellate Division.' In
five of the New York cases, the court denied the custodial
parent's request to relocate with the child.3 2
Prior to Tropea, lower courts developed a three-tiered
test to make relocation decisions.' First, it was determined
whether a noncustodial parent would be deprived of "regular
and meaningful access to the child."3 4 If access still existed,
the court would permit the move. 3 ' If "regular and meaning-
ful access" would be disrupted, there was a presumption that
the move was not in the child's best interests and the custo-
dial parent would be forced to demonstrate exceptional cir-
another. Id. at 298.
126. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1991).
127. Id. at 847.
128. Id. At the time of the hearing, the mother was also unemployed. Id. at
843. One of her reasons for relocating near her family was to help her care for
the children while she attended college to obtain a degree. Id. at 842-43.
129. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
130. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
131. Messler v. Messier, 638 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1996); Daniels v. Dan-
iels, 637 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1996); Wilson v. Wilson, 629 N.Y.S.2d 326
(App. Div. 1995); Bleck v. Brown, 629 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div. 1995); Carroll v.
Carroll, 628 N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div. 1995); Elkus v. Elkus, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138
(App. Div. 1992); Lavelle v. Lavelle, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1992); Leslie v.
Leslie, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Div. 1992).
132. Wilson, 679 N.Y.S.2d 326; Bleck, 629 N.Y.S.2d 315; Elkus, 588 N.Y.S.2d
138; Lavelle, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875; Leslie, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164.
133. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 149. The Tropea court cited ten lower court rul-
ings, dating back to Klein v. Klein 460 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Div. 1983), which
had created their own formulas and presumptions when making decisions in





cumstances to justify the move."8 If the exceptional circum-
stances were proved to the court's satisfaction, only then did
the court consider the child's "best interests.
" 137
This "three-step test" put a substantial burden on the
custodial parent requesting relocation.'38 In Leslie v. Leslie,'
for example, the trial court's ruling permitting the mother to
relocate was reversed as she failed to demonstrate that
"exceptional circumstances" existed." ° The court, while ac-
knowledging that the child's best interests was the predomi-
nant concern,' determined that move away disputes require
"a careful balancing of the rights and problems of both the
child and of his or her parents."'
Less than two months after the Leslie decision, in Lavelle
v. Lavelle,"" the court also held that the primary considera-
tion is the best interests of the child.'" However, the Lavelle
court determined that when the noncustodial parent's visita-
tion is substantially affected, the relocation is presumed not
to be in the child's best interest. "5 The court asserted that
although the mother was awarded sole custody at the time of
divorce, the employment transfer of her new husband was
not a sufficient reason for allowing a relocation as it was a
purely voluntary decision which involved only economic bet-
terment.
4 6
In Wilson v. Wilson,47 the most recent case prior to Tro-
pea, the court acknowledged that the custodial parent's rea-
son for moving was due to economic necessity but, because
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
139. 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Div. 1992).
140. See Leslie v. Leslie, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Div. 1992). In Leslie, the
mother wanted to move to obtain a doctoral degree from the University of Vir-
ginia with the hope of improving the standard of living for herself and her son.
Id. at 165. The court determined that obtaining an advanced degree was "a de-
sire for economic betterment, as opposed to economic necessity, [and] does not
constitute an exceptional circumstance sufficient to justify a move." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Lavelle v. Lavelle, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1992).
144. Id. at 876.
145. Id. at 876. The court further stated that the presumption could be re-
butted if there were exceptional circumstances presented by the relocating par-
ent. Id.
146. Id.
147. 629 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1995).
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the necessity was "foreseeable and self created," the court
held that the custodial parent had "failed to overcome the
presumption that the proposed relocation would not be in the
best interests of the children."'48 The Wilson court asserted
that the "best interests" test precluded relocation unless it
could be proven that the relocation itself was in the child's
best interest, placing the burden on the relocating parent to
show exceptional circumstances.'49 Although the courts in
Leslie, Lavelle, and Wilson considered the best interests of
the child per section 240 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law, the additional burden on the moving parent to show ex-
ceptional circumstances created a standard neither codified
by statute nor supported by New York Court of Appeals
precedent." °
D. The Burgess and Tropea Decisions
The highest courts in California and New York inter-
preted existing laws regarding relocation to provide a consis-
tent standard that courts could use when addressing reloca-
tion issues.' On March 26, 1996, the New York Court of
Appeals, resolving two cases"' in a single decision, held that
the custodial parent, who had sole physical custody of the
children, was allowed to relocate outside the area where the
noncustodial parent resided.'53 Less than one month later,
the California Supreme Court also held that the custodial
parent was allowed to relocate.
1. The Tropea Decision
In the first case addressed in Tropea v. Tropea, the
148. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). According to the facts presented in the
court's decision, the "foreseeable and self created" circumstance the custodial
parent was faced with was caused by her acceptance of a marriage proposal
from a college professor who was not given tenure at a nearby college and had
to search for a position away from the custodial parent's former marital resi-
dence. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text; N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 240 (McKinney 1996).
151. See discussion infra Parts II.E.1-2.
152. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). The two cases decided in
the Tropea decision were Tropea v. Tropea and Browner v. Kenward. Id. at
146-48.
153. Id. at 146.
154. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 476 (Cal. 1996).
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mother, Tammy Tropea, petitioned to change the visitation
arrangement and for permission to relocate with her two sons
to where her fianc6 lived and had an established business.'55
The father cross-petitioned for a custody change in favor of
himself, asserting that Ms. Tropea was moving as part of a
lifestyle choice for which he should not be "'punished' by the
loss of proximity and weekday contact" with his sons.' The
court was not persuaded by the father's allegations relating
to the mother's purported "unclean hands," and the court
emphasized that conduct of either parent which does not im-
pact the child would not be considered and should not be
brought before the court.5 7 Finding that the move was in the
children's best interests,'58 the court noted that the new visi-
tation schedule allowed for frequent and extended contact
with the father.'
The second case resolved in the Tropea decision involved
Jacqueline Browner, Andrew Kenward, and their son. 160 Ms.
Browner had sole physical custody of their son.' The father
had liberal visitation.'62 Ms. Browner petitioned for permis-
sion to relocate 130 miles away from Mr. Kenward's home in
White Plains, New York, as she wished to accompany her
parents to Pittsfield, Massachusetts. 6 ' The move to Pittsfield
was also prompted by Ms. Browner's loss of a job and inabil-
155. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 146. The original agreement between the parties
gave sole custody of the children to Ms. Tropea, visitation to the father, and re-
stricted both parties from relocating outside the county of their former marital
residence without prior judicial approval. Id. The requested move was from
Syracuse to Schenectady, approximately two and a half hours away. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 152. The court made it clear that:
[R]elocation determinations are not to be made as a means of casti-
gating one party for what the other deems personal misconduct, nor
are the courts to be used in this context as arbiters of the parties' re-
spective "guilt" or "innocence." Children are not chattel.., decisions
should be made with a view toward what serves their interests.
Id. This comment by the court was in response to the father's continued bitter-
ness and hostility to his ex-wife, which included statements that she was a
"tramp" and a "lowlife" in the children's presence. Tropea v. Tropea, 665
N.E.2d 145, 147 (N.Y. 1996).
158. Id. at 152.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 147.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 147 (N.Y. 1996).
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ity to find meaningful work in New York.' Ms. Browner had
found a marketing job in Pittsfield which would give her
enough income to rent a home of her own.165
In analyzing the Browner v. Kenward case, the court re-
viewed the appellate division's use of the "meaningful access"
test '6 and found that, although the elimination of the mid-
week visitation would diminish the quality of weekend visits,
Mr. Kenward was not deprived of the "opportunity to main-
tain a close relationship with his son."'67 The court implied
that the "open-ended balancing analysis" of the child's best
interests now required had already been considered at the
lower court level. 8' Since the father's primary argument was
that the appellate division misapplied the three-tiered test
(which the Tropea court concluded was not determinative),
the court affirmed the appellate division's ruling.'69
In deciding to permit both Ms. Tropea and Ms. Browner
to relocate, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the three-step test used by the lower courts 7 ' was difficult to
apply. Citing problems defining words, such as "meaningful
access," and trying to determine how far is too far,'' the court
of appeals reasoned that each case must be looked at on its
own merits, with a predominant emphasis on the best inter-
ests of the child.'72 According to the court of appeals, the best
interests of the child might be served in a variety of ways, in-
cluding changing custody as an alternative to forcing the cus-
todial parent to remain, or the possibility of relocating the
noncustodial parent.' The appellate court emphasized the
164. Id.
165. Id. at 148. Ms. Browner also stated that she relied on her parents for
both emotional and financial support, that the son was close to his grandpar-
ents, and that he was close to his cousins in the new city. Id.
166. Id. at 152.
167. Id.
168. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 152 (N.Y. 1996).
169. Id.
170. See supra Part II.D.2.
171. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 149 (citing a case that disapproved of an 84 mile
move, but also citing other cases that approved a 258 and a 340 mile move, re-
spectively (citations omitted)).
172. Id. at 150.
173. Id. at 151. The court then outlined a set of factors, or considerations,
that should be used in relocation cases including: (1) good faith of parent who
is requesting or opposing the move; (2) child's attachment with each parent;
(3) possibility of devising a visitation schedule that will maintain a meaningful
parent-child relationship; (4) quality of the lifestyle the child would have if the
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importance of placing the needs of the child first, since chil-
dren are "innocent victims of their parents' decision to di-
vorce and are the least equipped to handle the stresses of the
changing family situation."'74
2. The Burgess Decision
Faced with inconsistent results in relocation cases at the
lower court levels, the California Supreme Court heard its
own "relocation case," In re Marriage of Burgess,' twenty
days after the Tropea decision.'76 The Burgess case involved a
relocation request by Wendy Burgess 77 who sought perma-
nent physical custody of two minor children and permission
to relocate approximately forty miles away from the noncus-
todial parent, Paul Burgess.' During the marriage dissolu-
tion proceedings in July of 1992, the temporary custody order
granted both parents joint legal custody, but sole physical
custody to Ms. Burgess."' A mediation agreement provided a
detailed schedule for weekly visitation with the father.s The
agreement contained no provision in the event either parent
decided to relocate outside of Kern County. 8'
At a custody hearing in February of 1993, Ms. Burgess
notified the court that she accepted a job transfer in another
city approximately forty miles away from the former marital
residence.8 Mr. Burgess testified at the hearing that he
wished to be the children's primary caretaker if Ms. Burgess
moved. 8 The trial court granted joint legal custody to both
parents, but gave sole physical custody to Ms. Burgess.'
move were permitted or denied; (5) any possible negative impact from contin-
ued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents; (6)
effect of the move on extended family relationships; and, finally, (7) a "catch all"
provision that would include any other facts or circumstances that should be
considered. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151.
174. Id. at 150.
175. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
176. See supra note 6.
177. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 476. Ms. Burgess had temporary physical custody
of the minor children. Id.
178. Id. at 476-77.
179. Id. at 476.
180. Id. at 477.
181. Id. at 476-77. The facts do not indicate whether Ms. Burgess was con-
sidering relocation at the time of the mediation agreement. Burgess, 913 P.2d
at 476.
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The court order retained the existing visitation schedule and
also provided a schedule to be used if the mother relocated.'85
Mr. Burgess then moved for reconsideration and for a change
in custody, but his motion was denied. 8 ' In August of 1993,
the trial court issued an order, finding that "it is in the best
interests of the minor children that the minors be permitted
to move.., and that the [father] be afforded liberal visita-
tion.""'87 The father appealed both the order denying recon-
sideration and the order denying change in custody.' The
appeals were thereafter consolidated.88 The court of appeal
reversed the lower court's ruling granting custody to the
mother, after finding "no showing of necessity was made"8 °
and that the reality of the move was merely out of conven-
ience for the custodial parent."'
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
trial court had not abused its discretion 9 ' and concluded that
the court of appeal erred when requiring Ms. Burgess to show
the necessity of relocation.'93 According to the supreme court,
"[a] parent seeking to relocate with the minor children bears
no burden of establishing that the move is 'necessary.'"'
194




188. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1996).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 478. The court of appeal formulated a test that was to be used at
the trial court level to initially determine if the move would significantly. impact
the existing pattern of care and adversely affect the nature and quality of the
noncustodial parent's contact with the child. Id. The burden is on the noncus-
todial parent. Id. at 477-78. If this burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
custodial parent and the trial court must determine whether the move is
"reasonably necessary." Id. If the trial court concludes that the move is neces-
sary, it then decides whether the benefit of the child going with the "moving
parent outweighs the loss or diminution of contact with the nonmoving parent."
Burgess, 913 P.2d at 477-78. The test used by the court of appeal, however, ap-
pears to be neither consistent nor inconsistent with prior case law, since the
previous cases considered a variety of factors. Id.
191. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,477-78 (Cal. 1996).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 479.
194. Id. The court stated later in the opinion that even though this case in-
volved an initial custody matter, "the same conclusion applies when a parent
who has sole physical custody under an existing custody order seeks to relocate:
the custodial parent seeking to relocate, like the noncustodial parent doing the




relocation request,'95 the supreme court concluded that since
section 3040 "specifically refrains from establishing a prefer-
ence or presumption in favor of any arrangement for custody
and visitation,"'96 section 3020 of the California Family Code
does not constrain a trial court to require "frequent and con-
tinuing contact with both parents."197 The supreme court also
noted that section 7501 of the Family Code provides the long-
established rule that the primary parent who has custody is
entitled to move unless it would be detrimental to the child.'98
Acknowledging the emotional ties and resulting stability a
child develops with the custodial parent, the court also con-
cluded that the burden will be on the noncustodial parent to
prove that shifting custody to him or her would be in the
child's best interest. 199
The interpretation of existing laws by the California Su-
preme Court in Burgess firmly establishes a "presumptive
'right' of a primary custodial parent to relocate with the child
unless such a relocation would result in 'prejudice' to the
child's 'rights or welfare.'" ' ° If custody was established pre-
viously, the "changed circumstance" test.0 . supplements the
"best interests" test.2 However, the best interest test still
controls.02
III. STATEMENT OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The Burgess and Tropea decisions remove the "tests"
lower courts had developed to resolve relocation cases with-
out creating alternative standards to take their place.2" In-
stead, the Tropea decision gives the trial court judge ultimate
discretion to consider any factors he or she deems relevant
195. Id. at 480.
196. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1996).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 482. In addition to the burden being on the noncustodial parent
to demonstrate that the move will not be in the child's best interests, "[the
showing required [is to] be substantial." Id.
200. Id.
201. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 482 (Cal. 1996). The changed
circumstance test addresses whether "new circumstances" represent a signifi-
cant change by looking back to the previous custody agreement and its sur-
rounding circumstances. If a significant change has occurred, the court will re-
evaluate the custody arrangement. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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and to accord them an arbitrary weight when balancing the
competing interests of each parent."5 Burgess, on the other
hand, defers to the existing custody arrangement and holds
that a primary parent who wishes to relocate with a child
may do so without proving that the move is necessary.0 6
What both decisions fail to do is provide guidelines to en-
sure uniformity and predictability in relocation cases. By
removing the "tests" previously used by the lower courts,
New York and California courts have eliminated one prob-
lem, but have created another. These decisions have left at-
torneys and parents unsure as to how to structure a custody
and visitation arrangement which will protect each parent's
interests. This could prove to be detrimental to the child's
best interests. Lower court judges must now adhere to a new
precedent that may be more uncertain and ambiguous than
that which existed before these cases were decided.
Although the Burgess and Tropea courts attempted to
deal with the single legal issue of relocation, the outcome has
been to raise a more fundamental issue of who should raise a
child. These decisions have polarized parents and have
raised ideological and social concerns that go beyond the legal
ramifications of the decisions themselves.
IV. ANALYSIS
Relocation cases continue to be viewed as a problem
without a solution due, in part, to the philosophical discord
as to whether the child's best interests lie more in continuing
contact with both parents or the greater stability that comes
from the security of the relationship with the custodial par-
ent. ' The issue is further complicated by the current laws in
both states that provide imprecise standards in an effort to
ensure maximum flexibility.
The legal solutions to the problem of relocation have
been inconsistent. Prior to Burgess and Tropea, lower courts
complicated existing laws by establishing tests or multi-step
thresholds that parents had to meet even before the best in-
terest of the child was considered.0 8 While the Burgess and
Tropea courts stripped away those tests, they increased the
205. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
206. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996).
207. See discussion supra Part II.B.2-3.
208. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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confusion surrounding the standards to be applied in move
away cases. A full consideration of the cases suggests that
custody disputes arising in the context of a move should be
resolved in accordance with the same factors used to resolve
any other custody conflict.
A. The Need for Guidance and Consistency at the Lower
Court Level
Decisions prior to Burgess and Tropea treated relocation
disputes as a unique issue-separate from other custody de-
cisions.0 9 The standards and tests used by the lower courts
in New York were particularly harsh on custodial parents
proposing to move. 10 This suggests that New York courts,
which had less experience with shared custody orders than
did California courts, 1' premised the initial sole custody de-
termination on the custodial parent remaining in the area
absent extraordinary circumstances. New York courts made
it clear that relocation could be grounds for transferring cus-
tody to the noncustodial parent--only the proposed move
called into question the existing arrangement, not dissatis-
faction with the caretaking abilities of the custodial parent.
California, on the other hand, has codified definitions of
custody arrangements which provided a clearer standard for
lower courts to follow in evaluating custody issues.22 Lower
courts also used the definitions to evaluate relocation cases.
"Joint physical custody" and "sole physical custody,"1 labeled
at the time of an initial custody determination, gave courts a
framework within which to work when custody arrangements
had to be revisited. California courts, appearing to ignore the
labels, demonstrated a greater willingness to allow a parent
with sole custody to move even if the parent could not show
extraordinary circumstances. 4
B. Interpretation of Burgess and Tropea Decisions
The Burgess and Tropea decisions emphasize that the
child's best interests should be of primary importance when
209. See discussion supra Part II.C.
210. See discussion supra Part 1I.C.2.
21L See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
212. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
213. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
214. See supra note 118.
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trial courts decide relocation cases,"' sweeping away older
rulings that focused on the impact of a proposed move on the
parents rather than on the child. 16 Burgess makes clear that
moves are to be decided in accordance with the same consid-
erations that underlie other custody disputes, which is to ap-
prove a custody arrangement that will ensure the child's best
interests.217 Tropea, however, makes the best interests ra-
tionale central to move away cases, but also considers factors
such as a parent's motive for the move, as well as other is-
sues particular to moves, as relevant to the extent that they
affect the child's interests.18
The problem with both of these decisions is that atten-
tion has been focused on the child without clear guidance as
to what constitutes a child's best interests. Because appel-
late courts give trial courts substantial deference, only over-
ruling a decision if there has been an abuse of discretion,2 9
the high courts seem to guarantee a measure of inconsis-
tency, chaos, and confusion in future cases at the lower court
levels.2 ° However, despite the court's insistence on eschew-
ing bright line rules,221 the Burgess and Tropea decisions also
suggest that there may be some common ground.
1. The Burgess Decision: What It Does and Does Not Do
Lower court decisions prior to Burgess were inconsis-
tent, 2 though most of the recent appellate court decisions in
California ultimately granted relocation to the moving par-
215. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996); Tropea v. Tropea
665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
216. See discussion supra Part II.C.1-2.
217. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
219. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478; Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 148.
220. The decisions could also increase litigation. For example, since the Tro-
pea decision, the appellate courts have had to decide several relocation cases.
See Burnham v. Basta, 659 N.Y.S.2d 945 (App. Div. 1997); Morlando v. Mor-
lando, 659 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 1997); Huff v. Keely, 659 N.Y.S.2d 111 (App.
Div. 1997); Mendoza v. Adamson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1997); Davis v.
Davis, 656 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 1997); Griffen v. Evans, 652 N.Y.S.2d 380
(App. Div. 1997); Castler v. Castler, 650 N.Y.S.2d 351 (App. Div. 1996); Harder
v. Yandoh, 644 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1996); Schindler v. Schindler, 643
N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1996).
221. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483; Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 150 ("[Ilt is counterpro-
ductive to rely on presumptions whose only real value is to simplify what are
necessarily extremely complicated inquiries."). Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 150.
222. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
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ent. 3 The courts, at times, applied the best interests of the
child in context of how the move might limit frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; at other
times the type of custody arrangement, whether sole or joint,
224
was a consideration.
The Burgess decision is unique. According to the Burgess
court, relocation is not a separate issue from custody.225 Relo-
cation, as a modification to the original custody determina-
tion, requires the same kinds of considerations that are used
in an initial custody determination.226 For example, the court
emphasized section 7501 of the California Family Code as
controlling when the primary parent decides to relocate.
The importance of applying this statute is that it recognizes a
custody determination was made prior to a proposed move.
The move is viewed in context of an existing arrangement
which has previously considered the best interests of the
child. Instead of revisiting the issue of custody, the court
considers whether the move is so harmful as to justify a
change in custody to the other parent. The noncustodial par-
ent then has the burden of proving that a change in custody
is essential to the child's welfare. 2" By removing the burden
from the moving parent, courts in California are not allowed
to hold the primary parent hostage to a particular geographic
location. A change in custody occurs only if the court deter-
mines that the nonprimary parent is the better parent. The
primary parent, who is a fit parent, will retain custody and
may relocate if the move is not harmful to the child.
A problem with the Burgess decision is that it does not
clearly address joint custody.229 The opinion briefly discusses
joint physical custody in a footnote;.. however, it does not in-
dicate which parent will have the burden of proof to justify a
change from joint to sole physical custody or what factors
223. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
224. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
225. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996).
226. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
227. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 480.
228. Id. at 481-82.
229. Id. The court addressed the issue of joint custody in the text of the
opinion only minimally when it instructed trial courts to consider whether the
custody change is expedient, essential, and imperative for the welfare of the
child. Id. at 482-83.
230. Id. at 483, n.12. The court instructs trial courts to determine de novo a
new primary custody arrangement in light of the best interests of the child. Id.
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may be considered. If a custody arrangement is truly "joint
physical custody," there is not a custodial parent or a noncus-
todial parent to whom to assign this burden."'
Applying the best interests standard as codified in sec-
tion 3011 of the California Family Code, the court could con-
sider additional factors. For instance, courts could look at:
which parent provided the most care before the move, the ad-
vantages of staying in the community versus the advantages
of moving, whether the child has developed a closer bond to
one parent, and any other factors it deems important. In
making this determination, the reasons for the move should
be irrelevant. The impact on the child, however, is very im-
portant. For example, if the child is a star basketball player
and has a chance at securing a college scholarship, but there
are no comparable basketball opportunities in the new loca-
tion, the move would disadvantage the child. On the other
hand, if a parent is moving because of a great new job that
will vastly improve the parent's standard of living and allows
the parent to spend more time with the child, this is in the
child's best interests. The fact that the move ends the joint
custody arrangement should be irrelevant unless the move is
motivated by spite.
2. The Tropea Decision: What It Does and Does Not Do
The outcomes in the New York decisions prior to Tropea
were fairly consistent, usually denying a moving parent's re-
quest to relocate. 2" Relocation requests were often denied,
primarily because the parent could not meet the initial bur-
den imposed by the court to prove that the move was neces-
sary.233 These decisions discouraged parents from attempting
to relocate with a child because of this burden."4
The Tropea court reached the conclusion that relocation
cases should be decided using a "best interests of the child"
231. "Ordinarily, after a judicial custody determination, the noncustodial
parent seeking to alter the order for legal and physical custody can do so only
on a showing that there has been a substantial change of circumstances so af-
fecting the minor child that the modification is essential to the child's welfare."
Id. at 481-82 (emphasis added). For examples of cases that have been decided
in light of Burgess, see In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct.
App. 1997); Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1996).
232. See discussion supra Part II.C.
233. See discussion supra Part II.C.
234. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
546 [Vol. 38
CUSTODY RELOCATION
standard. Although the conclusion is similar in Burgess, the
underlying analysis differs. The Tropea court expressly
eliminated the multi-step analysis formulated at the lower
courts,236 which starts with the justifications for the move, as
it "erects artificial barriers to the court's consideration of all
of the relevant factors." 6
One reason for eliminating the three-tiered analysis was
the inability of the lower courts to uniformly define
"meaningful access." Additionally, the court expressed con-
cern that requiring the moving parent to prove "exceptional
circumstances" risked overlooking cases where a child would
benefit if the move were granted. The Tropea court cited a
hypothetical move due to Mom's remarriage as an example of
when a move would benefit the child."7 If a lower court is
faced with this situation, the issue is whether the disadvan-
tages to the child from the move, i.e., loss of contact with
Dad, outweigh the advantages of a new family unit and the
greater continued contact with Mom, the primary caretaker.
This differs from prior lower court decisions in that the rea-
sons for the move and impact on the noncustodial parent are
considered only to the extent that they affect the determina-
tion of the child's best interests.
This approach is similar to Burgess, with the exception
that Tropea does not begin with a presumption in favor of
keeping the child with the custodial parent under the exist-
ing custody order. Relocation should be viewed in terms of
whether a move justifies a change in custody from one parent
to the other. This approach emphasizes that parents will be
required to structure their lives in a way that will accommo-
date the child, rather than forcing a child to accommodate
the parent's lives. For example, the court provided sugges-
tions on ways visitation may be modified, such as extended
visitation periods or the possibility of relocation of the non-
custodial parent."8 The decision also made clear that there
should not be a presumption of enjoining a parent from
moving to maintain the status quo.
While Tropea has provided some guidance, two flaws in
the decision prevent it from resolving the relocation issue.
235. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
236. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 149-50 (N.Y. 1996).
237. Id. at 151.
238. Id. at 150.
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First, the Tropea court restricts the best interests test by
emphasizing how the impact of the move will affect the rela-
tionship of the child and noncustodial parent,2"9 as well as the
custodial parent's reason for the move. 40 By placing a non-
custodial parent's visitation or the custodial parent's motives
as key considerations,24' the Tropea court has, in effect, in-
structed the lower courts to consider the best interests of the
child in light of the parent's motives for requesting or oppos-
ing the move.
Second, the Tropea court instructed the lower courts to
decide whether the proposed move would serve the child's
best interests based on a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard.2 4 The result is to place the burden of proof with the
moving party. However, since Tropea revisits custody at the
time of a move, the parent who shoulders the burden of proof
should be the parent who is least involved with the child.
For example, if the nonmoving parent is only minimally in-
volved with the child, the burden should be on that parent to
prove that this minimal involvement is more beneficial to the
child's best interests than if the move were granted. To hold
otherwise reestablishes a presumption against the move re-
gardless of the parenting arrangement. In turn, this could
have the same effect of enjoining the custodial parent in a
manner similar to cases decided prior to Tropea.
C. Reconciling the Child's Best Interests with the
Parent's Best Interests
The fundamental question underlying relocation disputes
is how to determine what is in a child's best interests.2 4 In
some cases, a parent's circumstances may be considered. In
other cases, the parent's circumstances may be ignored or
treated as independent from those of the child.244 The par-
ent's interests should be relevant to custody disputes to the
extent that they affect the parent's role as a caregiver.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 151. After instructing the lower courts to feel free to consider fac-
tors it deems relevant, the court said "[t]hese factors include, but are certainly
not limited to each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move .....
(emphasis added). Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
242. Id. at 151-52.
243. See discussion supra Parts II.C-D.
244. See discussion supra Parts II.C-D.
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For example, if a parent has been the primary caretaker
of a child, with little or no involvement by the noncustodial
parent, the primary parent's interests should be given defer-
ence when deciding whether to grant or deny relocation. Or,
if both parents assume close to or equal to a 50-50 shared
custody arrangement, the interests of each parent would be
secondary to the best interests of the child.
The most common type of custody arrangement is some-
thing in between these two extremes. Usually the shared
custody arrangement is less than equal. One parent is re-
sponsible for most of the primary caretaking responsibili-
ties.245 Granting or denying a move for these types of cases
requires looking at both the parent's and the child's best in-
terests.
Neither the Burgess nor the Tropea decision address
these types of custody arrangements when identifying what
factors a court should consider when faced with a relocation
case. The law in California recognizes sole custody and joint
custody but does not label the type of arrangement that most
parents have-something in between joint custody and sole
custody. New York law simply addresses custody in terms of
physical custody and visitation and does not attempt to de-
fine custody arrangements in terms of how childrearing re-
sponsibilities are shared. Because the courts do not first
identify the parenting arrangement, the courts encourage
needless litigation. For example, in New York, a parent that
is providing almost all of a child's care will have to go before
the court and prove that the move is in the child's best inter-
est the same way a parent who has something akin to a joint
custody arrangement would have to do. However, in Califor-
nia, the court unfairly burdens the noncustodial parent who
is very active in the child's life.
V. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes that both the California Family
Code and the New York Domestic Relations Law be amended
through legislation to include a statute for relocation cases.
A codified standard will ensure that move away decisions, re-
gardless of the judge or geographic location, will have a
245. Several of the cases discussed in the background have fact patterns that
would meet this criteria. See discussion supra Parts II.C-D.
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measure of uniformity and fairness. In addition, state legis-
lature has a duty to provide guidance where there has been
consensus. The suggested guidelines clearly identify the ar-
eas of consensus in move away cases, while incorporating the
analysis that is implicit in the Burgess and Tropea decisions.
The benefit of making the analysis in Burgess and Tropea ex-
plicit is that it will save a lot of trouble and confusion for
lower courts, as well as aid parents and their lawyers when
making custody decisions.
The proposal is a framework that should be modified for
each state. California has already established custody labels
that identify two types of custody arrangements;246 thus, the
proposed parenting arrangements listed below should incor-
porate those labels. Since New York does not define custody
the same way, 47 the parenting arrangements can now be
used to aid courts in identifying the respective involvement of
each parent to his or her child.
A. Types of Custody Arrangements
There appear to be three distinct types of child custody
arrangements, irrespective of the labels used when custody is
awarded. First, there is the situation where one parent has
assumed most of the caretaking responsibilities of the child,
and, for purposes of this proposal, this parent will be referred
to as the "primary parent." In the primary parent arrange-
ment, there is no significant involvement by the other parent,
referred to as the "noncustodial parent." The lack of in-
volvement could be due to a move by the noncustodial parent
making contact difficult or impossible, only occasional week-
end visitation by the noncustodial parent, or visitation by the
noncustodial parent diminishing over time to the point that
the noncustodial parent's involvement is minimal.
A second type of custody arrangement is one which in-
volves both parents raising a child jointly, close to a 50-50 ar-
rangement, whereby each parent has an integral role in the
child's life. This parenting arrangement will be referred to as
"joint parenting." In this case, neither parent has a more
significant role in providing support and caregiving to the
child. It is not intended that this arrangement mandates ex-
246. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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actly a 50-50 commitment as measured by the amount of
time spent in the care of each parent. However, either par-
ent must be available in the event of medical emergencies,
conferences with teachers, medical appointments, social ac-
tivities, such as school events or sports, and any other situa-
tions that either parent would be expected to attend if the
family was still intact. If only one parent assumes the re-
sponsibility for the activities listed above, then the parenting
arrangement will not be considered joint parenting.
The final parenting arrangement would encompass all
other arrangements. This type of parenting plan, referred to
as "shared parenting," would include less than a 50-50 ar-
rangement but more than weekend visitation by the noncus-
todial parent. The shared parenting plan would include
cases that are factually similar to Burgess and Tropea,
wherein both parents share childrearing responsibilities, but
in unequal amounts. Exact percentages of time spent with
the child will not be dispositive but will be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis using the factors outlined below.
B. Presumption in Favor of Granting a Move
The legislature should acknowledge a presumption in fa-
vor of allowing a parent and child to move in three clearly de-
fined circumstances. First, if the parent seeking to relocate
is the primary parent,248 then a move should be granted un-
less the noncustodial parent can show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the move is detrimental to the child's
health, safety, welfare, or is being done in a spiteful or frivo-
lous manner solely to frustrate visitation by the noncustodial
parent. A presumption favoring the move of a primary par-
ent is similar to the court's rationale in Burgess. "9 However,
this proposal limits the presumption to cases where the non-
custodial parent has had minimal, if any, involvement with
the child and ignores the labels used in a custody agreement.
Second, in cases of shared parenting, there should be a
two-tiered test. To create a presumption in favor of the
move, the moving parent must first show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the move is important to either the
child or the parent's well-being. Factors meeting such a test
248. Primary parent as defined in Part V.A.
249. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996).
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include, but are not limited to, family relationships, and op-
portunities for marriage or remarriage, education, or em-
ployment superior to those available in the existing location.
The parent opposing the move may do so successfully by
showing that the proffered reasons are in fact trivial or that
the move is designed to frustrate the opposing parent.
If the moving parent meets the first test, that parent
must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
having the child remain with the moving parent will further
the child's best interests. In this prong of the test, the rea-
sons for the move will be irrelevant and the standards for de-
termination shall be the same as those in any other custody
determination. For example, the Tropea court outlined a se-
ries of factors tailored to move away cases which included:
the child's respective attachments to each parent, capability
of parents to devise a visitation schedule that would enable
the noncustodial parent meaningful contact with the child,
the quality of the child's lifestyle if the move were permitted,
and the effect of the move on extended family relationships.25 °
Third, a move should be favored where the continued in-
volvement of both parents is detrimental to the child and the
parent best meeting the child's best interests desires to move.
Involvement by both parents is detrimental to a child when
there is physical abuse or threats of physical abuse between
the parents, or the parents have a high conflict relationship
adversely impacting the child's well-being. Determining
which parent is best meeting the child's needs is a factual de-
termination that will be made on a case-by-case basis, with
careful examination of any possible dangers to the child's
health, safety, or welfare. If an abusive relationship is es-
tablished, the court will not be bound by the primary, shared,
or joint parenting arrangements discussed above.
C. Presumptions for Denying a Move
There are two circumstances in which the legislature
should recognize a presumption against a move. The first
example is when there is a joint parenting arrangement in
which both parents are actively involved in raising the child,
or share responsibility on a 50-50 basis, which could not con-
tinue if a move were granted. In such a case, the moving
250. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
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party could still retain custody upon a showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the child's best interest would
be better served by remaining with the moving parent. The
court should give serious consideration to the custody ar-
rangement that will best facilitate the child's continuing con-
tact with both parents in making this determination. The
moving parent's reason for the move should be irrelevant to
the custody determination, unless the other parent can show
that the sole reason for the move was to frustrate the joint
custody arrangement. If the move is granted, the nonmoving
parent will be granted liberal and extended visitation.
Second, there should be a presumption against a move
when a child's health or safety could be in jeopardy. "Health"
pertains primarily to a child's physical health. For example,
if a child has a disease that requires medical attention that
may not be available where the moving parent desires to re-
locate, the child's health becomes top priority and the pro-
posed move of the child should be denied. "Safety" should be
defined narrowly. It includes a consideration of potential
physical harm to the child from either the moving parent or
persons who will be in close contact with the child in the new
location. Persons who have been convicted of child abuse,
endangerment, or neglect mitigate against the move. Addi-
tionally, "safety" does not include hypothetical dangers such
as moving to an urban area or an unfamiliar city. A child's
health and safety take priority over the parenting arrange-
ment and the best interests of the child standard. If these
measures are not adequately met, relocation with the child
should be denied until the threat to the child's health or
safety no longer exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions impacting the lives of children are
subject to close scrutiny, because children are often viewed as
innocent victims of their environment. Relocation cases, in
particular, are seen as an additional burden on a child who
already suffered the break up of a family and is now cast in
the middle once again.
Some people find it hard to accept the decisions parents
make which affect their child's geographic stability or remove
their child from the community with which he or she is fa-
miliar. When the judicial system is forced to intervene and
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make a decision on behalf of the child, blame is shifted from
parents to the courts. When cases reach the states' high
courts, the case becomes a battleground in the larger conflict
over who should raise a child. The Burgess and Tropea deci-
sions should not be used as vehicles to establish societal
norms, as that is the duty of state legislatures. This com-
ment suggests a legislative solution that can be uniformly
applied, yet flexible enough to recognize and protect the in-
terests of parents who are actively participating in meeting
the physical and emotional needs of their child.
Pamela Markert*
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